lotus-lian詩欲 哲域+彩+

Philosophers have been obsessed with understanding and achieving propositional knowledge since Plato wondered in the theatetus  2,500 years ago what must be added to true belief in  order to get knowledge.

2500年前 柏拉圖的"泰鄂提德斯"篇中就論及知識是真信念再加上某樣東西而變成知識的 哲學家們便開始說明及研究如何理解命題知識

Plato’s search for a condition that must be added to true belief in order to get knowledge suggests that in order to know we must at the very least believe a true proposition. 

柏拉圖的研究中 如果要獲得知識 我們首先要研究真信念是加上了什麼條件才成為知識的 因此認為有知識的最低標準 就是擁有相信一個真命題

In any event, in at some contexts, we seem to require something more like subjective certainty in order to have knowledge, where subjective certainty is a belief-like state.

任何事態下與脈絡下 我們似乎都需要一些像是主動確知的方式去獲得知識 這種主動確知是種 "極為確信"的狀態

In an influential recent work, Williamson(2000) suggests that knowledge is the most general kind of factive state and that states like perceiving and remembering are species of knowledge – ways of knowing.

近年來Williamson指出,知識是種普遍的實在狀態 像是知覺到和記得都是知識的種類 __ "去知道"的方式

A view often referred to as the “traditional” analysis of knowledge suggests that knowledge is true conviction coupled with good enough reason supporting the conviction.

在對知識的傳統分析上 有個觀點認為知識就是有個足夠好到得以支持"此信念為真"的好理由

Descartes famously seemed to suggest that in order to know some proposition P, our epistemic situation E would need to be so good that it eliminated any possibility of error.

迪卡兒對於我們要知道某些命題P 我們的知態E則必須完美到去除所有可能的錯誤

Cartesian standards for knowledge are often dismissed with the quick observation that requiring justification that strong for knowledge would imply the absurd conclusion that virtually all of our knowledge claims are false.

迪卡兒式的知識標準常被認為以這麼強的證成判準作為知識可能導致荒謬的結論 也就是實際上我們擁有的知識都會被宣稱是假

John Hawthorne(2003) builds a discussion of knowledge around data concerning what we take to be just obvious concerning what we can and can’t say about knowledge of the outcome of fair lotteries.

John Hawthorne從公平彩券上探討對於知識所關注的問題:我們能不能談論知識

At least this is so if knowledge is, in the technical language of epistemologists, closed under known entailment.

至少對於知識來說 用個知識論者技術性的術語 就是知識蘊含封閉概念

Claims about the closure of knowledge are best understood as claims about what other knowledge one is in a position to possess, given that one knows P and certain truths about what P entails.

理解知識上的封閉性概念　較好的宣稱是：當某人在掌握命題Ｐ時　知道命題Ｐ與理解Ｐ蘊涵的命題中之確知的真

If you know some truth P, and you know that P 　entails (guarantees the truth of) Q then you are at least in a　position to know Q.

若知道Ｐ的真 你也會知道Ｐ蘊涵Ｑ(P中可以確知Q為真的保證) 那麼你會處於知道命題Q的狀態

A number of epistemologists point the finger at closure principles. Such principles have often been viewed with suspicion because of the role they(often) sometimes play in the arguments of the  feared skeptic. 

許多知識論學者將焦點放在封閉原則上 是由於懷疑論者拋出可怕的懷疑論證時它的角色

(當你使用封閉原則聲稱你所知道的知識 懷疑論者能夠提出"其實你的大腦只是被灌輸了某些系統性知識而使你誤以為你知道 擁有這個知識 如果你可以依照P而知道P蘊涵Q  那麼還可以說Q蘊涵某個T S與其他命題知識 看似建構出來的知識系統一但被剝離開系統位置 則顯得該知識毫無價值 就像駭客任務的電影中 尼歐雖然是救世主 但他基本上只是母體的一個錯誤)

The contextualist argues, in effect, that what a knowledge claim asserts varies from context to context– hence the name”contextualism.”

脈絡主義者並不同意: 事實上 得到並聲稱有知識是在一個個的背景內容底下__ 因此稱為脈絡主義

The key difference in the contextualist’s account of knowledge is the emphasis on relevant alternatives.  According to the contextualist, what counts as a relevant alternative varies from context to context.

脈絡主義強調知識是在相對的兩者間描述的 脈絡主義者認為 宣稱擁有的相對描述來自各個脈絡(脈絡主義者主張任何知識的屬性都是有相關的相對主觀)

David Lewis suggests various features of a person making a knowledge claim that determine when that person must be in a position to rule out a given alternative in order to make a true knowledge claim.

David Lewis認為 一個人要宣稱有真的知識 必須斷然排除其他不是建立這個知識的各個著點

Another of Lewis’s rules is the “rule of resemblance.” It requires that we may never legitimately ignore an alternative that resembles in the right way a relevant possibility. 

另一個說明Lewis的方式是"相似法則" 我們不能忽視那些相對於正確方式 可能有影響的相似可能性