lotus-lian詩欲 哲域+彩+

觀自在菩薩，行深般若波羅蜜多時，照見五蘊皆空，度一切苦厄。

舍利子！色不異空，空不異色；色即是空，空即是色；受想行識亦復如是。

The same love of pleasure, fostered by the whole tendency of their education, gives a trifling turn to the conduct of women in most circumstances; for instance, they are ever anxious about secondary things; and on the watch for adventures instead of being occupied by duties.

她們整體的教育傾向對享樂的愛好,稍微可以解釋女人在多數環境下的行為,她們關切次要的事物與稀有的冒險而不是責任（義務）

... ...

1. Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of these dictates.  In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule.

先前已經提過應以中庸作為行為選擇（的判準）不要過度與不及,中庸是正確準則,我們就該談論這些準則的本質.我們已提過了特質的狀態 其他事物上,若人能夠在強烈與放鬆間依他的行動表現得如他應表現的狀態,就是我們所說的不要過與不及,那就是中庸,正確的準則

2. The origin of action-- its efficient, not its final cause -- is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not and end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-- only that which is done is that; for good action is and end, and desire aims at this.

1. With regard to justice and inustice we must consider(1) what kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investigation shall follow the same course as the preeding discussions.

關於正義與不正義 則要先考量(一)它是關於什麼的行動(二)正義是什麼樣的意義(三)正義的行為是介於什麼樣的兩極間的取衡

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties as of state of character. A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state of character which is one of two contraries dose not produce the contrary result; e.g. as a result of his health we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man walks healthy, when he walks as a healthy man would.

1. Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual in the main owes both its birth, and its growth to teaching(for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ἠθική) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ἔθος (habit).

德性因而分為智慧的德性與道德的德性,智慧德性是伴隨人出生並藉由教導增長的(它需要時間與經驗)那麼德性因而是由習慣所養成,就如它稱為”道德的”這個字與”習慣的”這詞所演變來的道理一樣

1. since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments.

德性與行為和情感間的關係:是主動的情感 使行動值得讚揚 有時是寬恕與憐憫 而觀察主動與非主動自然是研究德性本質必然的工作 (這樣的工作)也對立法者在榮辱與懲罰上有所幫助

For such actions men are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or painful in return for great and noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest indignities for no noble end for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person.

 'I have seen, and heard, much of Cockney impudence before now; but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face.' So, infamously, the Victorian critic John Ruskin expressed his condemnation of James McNeil Whistler's phantasmagorical Nocture in Black and Gold of 1875. The libel action that ensued led to an apparently nominal victory for the artist -- he was awarded damages of just one farting -- but in reality it gave him much more: a platform from which to plead the rights of artists to express themselves, unfettered by critical constraints, and to raise the war cry of aestheticism-- 'are for art's sake'.

“我聽聞了許多傲慢的英國佬，但從未期望聽到何這樣的闊少對一幅描繪兩百多名大眾面容的畫作投注目光。“ 這是英國藝評約翰羅斯金對詹姆斯.惠思勒在1875年“黑與金“中，變幻無常的鋼琴曲風所下的批評。這類看似有名無實的誹謗，卻使藝術家獲得勝利--他只得到一個臭名--現實上他得到的更多-- 一個為藝術家自己辯護陳述的平台，從批評解放，並引發藝術超然論的大肆討論--“藝術所以藝術的理由“。

Ruskin's utter incomprehension of Whistler's work is nothing unusual. Each successive age see a restaging of the battle between artist and critic, in which the latter--often mirroring conservative public taste -- cries out in horror and disdain at the supposed excesses of a new and assertive generation of artists. In our own time we witness the constant wringing of critical hands at the latest artistic atrocity: a pickled shark, a urine-soaked canvas, an unmade bed. The conflict is timeless and beyond resolution because it is motivated by a fundamental disagreement on the most basic of questions: what is art?