what is love of philosophy?
- Aug 29 Sat 2009 11:05
Plato/The Republic/ X /Theory of Art
- Dec 18 Fri 2009 16:46
Spinoza ethics II RATIONALISM
- Dec 09 Wed 2009 18:42
Spinoza Ethics I

- Dec 06 Sun 2009 16:20
Tori Amos UPSIDE DOWN
- Dec 01 Tue 2009 09:12
प्रज्ञापारमिताहृदयसूत्र,Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya Sūtra
觀自在菩薩,行深般若波羅蜜多時,照見五蘊皆空,度一切苦厄。
舍利子!色不異空,空不異色;色即是空,空即是色;受想行識亦復如是。
- Nov 25 Wed 2009 19:33
selected from A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHT OF WOMAN/ MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT/短譯
The same love of pleasure, fostered by the whole tendency of their education, gives a trifling turn to the conduct of women in most circumstances; for instance, they are ever anxious about secondary things; and on the watch for adventures instead of being occupied by duties.
她們整體的教育傾向對享樂的愛好,稍微可以解釋女人在多數環境下的行為,她們關切次要的事物與稀有的冒險而不是責任(義務)
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- Nov 25 Wed 2009 14:08
slescted from Aristotle( Ἀριστοτέλης) Nicomachean Ethics book VI
1. Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule.
先前已經提過應以中庸作為行為選擇(的判準)不要過度與不及,中庸是正確準則,我們就該談論這些準則的本質.我們已提過了特質的狀態 其他事物上,若人能夠在強烈與放鬆間依他的行動表現得如他應表現的狀態,就是我們所說的不要過與不及,那就是中庸,正確的準則
2. The origin of action-- its efficient, not its final cause -- is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not and end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-- only that which is done is that; for good action is and end, and desire aims at this.
- Nov 22 Sun 2009 15:05
slescted from Aristotle( Ἀριστοτέλης) Nicomachean Ethics book V
1. With regard to justice and inustice we must consider(1) what kind of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our investigation shall follow the same course as the preeding discussions.
關於正義與不正義 則要先考量(一)它是關於什麼的行動(二)正義是什麼樣的意義(三)正義的行為是介於什麼樣的兩極間的取衡
We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the same is not true of the sciences and the faculties as of state of character. A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to relate to contrary objects, but a state of character which is one of two contraries dose not produce the contrary result; e.g. as a result of his health we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only what is healthy; for we say a man walks healthy, when he walks as a healthy man would.

